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ABSTRACT 
Research Summary: Research on foreign market entry has rarely considered that multinational 
firms’ new entries may be affected by the configuration of their existing affiliates. We argue that in 
making entry decisions, firms take into account how an entry into a new location helps increase the 
operational flexibility of their affiliate portfolios due to options to switch operations across affiliates 
in case of diverging labor cost developments across host countries. We juxtapose this real options 
based explanation with a risk diversification explanation. Analysis of Japanese multinational firms’ 
foreign entry decisions suggests that the two explanations are complementary. We also establish 
portfolio-level boundary conditions to the influence of operational flexibility considerations on 
entry, in the form of product diversification and the nature of dispersion of labor cost levels. 
 
Managerial Summary: When deciding on whether to enter a foreign market, managers of a 
multinational firm are intuitively aware that they need to consider how the economic environment of 
the target host country is related to the environments of the existing countries in which the firm 
operates. The less the environments are correlated with each other, whether in terms of input cost 
or market demand conditions, the greater the chance that the firm may capture cost savings and 
reduce sales volatility globally. These benefits arise from a switching option to shift operations 
flexibly across countries and from an ability to reduce risk by holding a portfolio of diversified 
global investments. Our findings support both sets of considerations, suggesting that companies do 
give due attention to correlations in labor cost and market demand between the target host country 
to enter and the existing host countries. 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational firms’ foreign entry decisions have long occupied an important place in strategic 
management research. To date, scholars have applied a variety of theoretical perspectives to examine 
antecedents of foreign entry, including agglomeration effects and organizational agglomeration 
(Belderbos, Olffen, & Zou, 2011), competitive interactions between firms (Gimeno et al., 2005), 
firm-specific characteristics such as experience and intangible assets (Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 
1997), as well as various environmental attributes such as industry growth (Kogut & Chang, 1996), 
market uncertainty (Chi & Seth, 2009), host country political risk (Henisz, 2002), and home and host 
country institutions more generally (Meyer et al., 2009). 
While prior research has significantly increased our understanding of the determinants of 
firms’ foreign entry decisions, it has primarily treated each entry as an independent event and has 
rarely considered that entry decisions may be affected by how firms’ existing portfolio of overseas 
affiliates is configured. In this paper, we draw on real options theory of multinational investment 
and argue that firms’ new entries depend on characteristics of the configuration of their existing 
affiliate portfolios. Multinational firms take into account the contribution that an entry into a new 
location makes towards increasing the operational flexibility of their manufacturing affiliate 
portfolios, which represents a unique advantage of multinationality compared to purely domestic 
operations (Kogut, 1985, 1989; de Meza & van der Ploeg, 1987). In the parlance of real options, 
such increase in operational flexibility derives from the enhanced options to switch value-added 
activities across internationally dispersed affiliates in case of diverging developments in labor and 
other input cost (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). Our paper moves beyond prior real options studies of 
the performance implications of operational flexibility embedded in multinationality (Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000; Tong & Reuer, 2007a; Lee & Makhija, 2009; Lee & Song, 2012; Belderbos et al., 
2014), by focusing on the question of how flexibility considerations may affect firms’ foreign entry 
decisions in the first place and what the moderating factors for such considerations are. 
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We conceptually and empirically juxtapose the real options-based view of the role of affiliate 
portfolio configuration in affecting foreign entry with prior theories emphasizing the role of 
potential risk reduction resulting from foreign direct investment (FDI) under uncertainty (e.g., 
Aliber, 1970; Rugman, 1976, 1977). While risk diversification theory highlights the benefit of 
reduced variability of revenue streams and focuses on heterogeneous demand conditions across 
countries, the switching options view of multinationality gives attention to input cost conditions and 
emphasizes managerial and organizational capabilities to exploit differences in labor cost changes 
and exchange rate movements (Kogut, 1983, 1985, 1989; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). In the real 
options view, differences and volatility in input cost developments among countries are a potential 
source of the multinational firm’s advantage (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). Our analysis juxtaposes real 
options related and risk reduction related influences and aims to identify their respective power in 
explaining entry patterns. 
We test hypotheses on a longitudinal dataset including the population of listed Japanese 
multinational firms and their manufacturing affiliates across 60 host countries from 1989 to 2006. 
Specifically, we analyze whether the hazard of firms’ entry into a particular host country in a 
particular year is a function of the expected increase in operational flexibility due to the addition of 
this location to the existing affiliate portfolio, while controlling for a host of other factors affecting 
entry in prior literatures, including the potential risk reduction consideration. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In the management literature, uncertainty has been often treated as synonymous with risk that 
should be avoided and diversified away (Kogut, 1991). For example, Rugman (1976, 1977) argues 
that multinational firms’ broad geographic scope can help reduce the variability of revenue streams 
because differences in demand conditions across countries can average out idiosyncratic risks. This 
risk reduction logic of FDI is related to, but distinct from, the real options view of multinational 
investment (Kogut, 1983, 1985, 1989; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). At a broad level, real options 
theory offers a more formal, finer-grained approach to analyzing firms’ investment behavior under 
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uncertainty than risk diversification theory. One specific, prominent difference between the two 
views is that whereas international diversification theory emphasizes “minimizing the risk of 
expected return” or the narrowing of the distribution of possible outcomes, real options theory 
highlights the capture of dynamic efficiency gains and upside potential by creating and exercising 
options “at the right place at the right time”. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) elaborate this difference 
aptly in their analysis of the switching options created by multinationality: “The benefits of 
diversification are created by the reduction in variance of the overall portfolio of subsidiary results. 
An option, on the other hand, is valuable because it gives managerial discretion to respond 
profitably to the realization of uncertain events.” Prior research also highlights that while it is easier 
for shareholders to obtain benefits of risk diversification by holding a portfolio of diversified 
securities (Morck & Yeung, 1991), flexibility benefits requiring managerial action are much harder to 
obtain through stock market diversification (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). 
Switching options are known as input mix flexibility options because of the flexibility to 
switch between alternative input sources or locations during the production process (Trigeorgis, 
1996). Although valuation of these compound options is difficult because of the complexity 
involved in managing calls and puts (Margrabe, 1978), significant evidence exists that firms and 
managers follow a real options “logic” in their strategic decision making (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; 
McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), rather than estimating option values per se (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). 
For instance, research has shown that multinational firms indeed shift their sourcing of inputs across 
locations in response to exchange rate movements (Rangan, 1998; Belderbos & Zou, 2009), and that 
operational flexibility enhances firm values (e.g., Sakhartov & Folta, 2014; Chang, Kogut, & Yang, 
2016). Research using survey data and self-disclosed information has also reported that managers are 
aware of, and take into account, real options under uncertainty in multinational investment (e.g., 
Driouchi & Bennett, 2011). 
In the section below, we first develop the baseline argument on the role of switching options 
(operating flexibility) in affecting firms’ foreign entry decisions. We then propose boundary 
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conditions that moderate the effect of operating flexibility on entry: (increase in the) dispersion of 
labor cost levels in the country portfolio, and industry diversification among the portfolio of 
affiliates. We further develop a hypothesis on the role of the host country’s labor cost volatility in 
shaping switching options and entry. These hypotheses are also derived in a stylized simulation 
analysis described in the Appendix to this paper. The simulation models examine the frequency of 
actual switching under different scenarios of cost correlations, cost level differences, switching costs 
and volatility, if a firm adds a third country to an existing portfolio of two. Switching occurs if the 
benefits of moving production, due to a change in labor cost rankings in a period, exceed switching 
costs. 
Hypotheses 
Kogut (1985, 1989) emphasizes that compared with their domestic counterparts, multinational firms 
enjoy higher operational flexibility. If multinational firms can shift production activities across 
countries in response to (adverse) changes in environmental conditions, they can increase 
production efficiencies and are less vulnerable to environmental shocks (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). 
Such switching opportunities are most salient if the environmental conditions in the various host 
countries in which firms operate do not develop in tune, but are uncorrelated, or negatively 
correlated. In that case, an input cost shock in one country provides opportunities to shift 
production to other countries where such a shock did not occur. Phrased in real options terms, 
having a portfolio of production affiliates provides options to switch under uncertainty concerning 
future cost developments. 
While each affiliate provides an option to switch production in the future, the switching 
option value embedded in the investment depends on the extent to which cost developments in the 
country of the affiliate are correlated, or uncorrelated, with cost developments in other countries in 
which the firm operates. In cases of strong positive correlations, a production affiliate may provide 
redundant rather than valuable switching options. Theoretical research in real options recognizes 
that individual options within a portfolio may be wholly or partially redundant in their values due to 
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overlaps among multiple investments (Trigeorgis, 1996), reducing the option value of the portfolio 
as a whole. In the context of multinational operations and switching options, correlations in labor 
costs among the countries in which the firm operates have been proposed as a major source of 
redundancy (e.g., Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Dasu & Li, 1997; de Meza & van der Ploeg, 1987). For 
manufacturing firms, labor cost development is a particularly critical consideration in international 
manufacturing and a major driver of FDI (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994), consistent with the notions 
that minimizing production cost is one of the primary objectives of geographically distributed plant 
configurations (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2014; Dasu & Li, 1997; Fisch & Zschoche, 2012), and that 
(changes in) relative levels of labor costs in the host countries drive multinational firms’ investment 
allocation decisions across countries (Belderbos et al., 2013). 
The arguments above suggest that one important consideration of the multinational firm 
when deciding whether to establish a manufacturing affiliate in a new location (host country) will be 
the role that this affiliate can assume in the firm’s portfolio of affiliates in terms of the additional 
switching option value and operational flexibility that it generates. Such increase in switching option 
value due to the entry will be greater, the smaller the labor cost correlations of the new country with 
the countries already in the existing portfolio. Thus, we propose: 
Baseline Hypothesis 1 (“Flexibility increase”): Multinational firms are more likely to enter a 
new host country, the less labor cost developments in that host country are correlated with labor cost 
developments in the existing foreign affiliate portfolio. 
We argue that the dispersion in labor cost levels in the different countries in which the firm 
operates affiliates can shape the effective opportunities for international production shifting. The 
exercise of switching options is most likely, and hence the flexibility value in a portfolio the greatest, 
if divergent labor cost developments lead to substantive changes in relative manufacturing costs of 
the countries in the portfolio, which firms can act upon. Whether changes in relative labor cost are 
substantive and actionable depends on the differences in labor cost levels of the countries in the 
portfolio. Differences in labor cost levels are affected by the focal entry into a new country, and are 
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reflected in the increase (or decrease) in labor cost level dispersion in the portfolio due to the 
addition of the focal host country to the portfolio. 
We posit that for switching opportunities to arise, increases in labor cost level differences 
should not be too large but neither be too small. The intuition, which is confirmed by simulation 
analysis, is relatively straightforward. In the case of very low dispersion and near-equal labor cost 
levels, there will be relatively little to gain in switching, as the magnitude of the changes in relative 
labor costs is also more limited and may not exceed switching costs. In the case of a very high 
dispersion in labor cost levels, the likelihood that for a given divergence in labor cost growth, there 
will be a meaningful change and reversal in labor cost levels calling for switching, is small. In 
addition, high labor cost differences may be associated with large differences in worker skills, 
productivity, production techniques, and product quality. As a result, it is likely that the different 
country locations are not effective substitutes, i.e., the switching costs in terms of additional training 
or adaptations in the production process are overly high. 
The arguments above suggest that addition of a new location to the affiliate portfolio 
influences switching options not only through a change in portfolio-level correlations in labor costs, 
but also through a change in the portfolio-level dispersion in labor cost levels. At low levels of labor 
cost dispersion increase due to an entry, switching opportunities are enhanced, as the increase in 
dispersion creates larger benefits of switching. In contrast, switching opportunities are likely to 
decrease if the labor cost level dispersion increase passes a certain threshold, when this dispersion 
implies differences in production techniques and skill levels that are too large to allow for flexibility, 
and when overall switching opportunities embedded in the portfolio decline. This suggests an 
inverted U-shaped moderating effect of the increase in labor cost level dispersion on the impact of 
flexibility increase on entry, providing a boundary condition for the prediction of H1: 
Hypothesis 2: The increase in labor cost level dispersion among the countries in the affiliate portfolio due 
to the entry into a host country moderates the positive impact of flexibility increase on firms’ propensity to 
enter the host country (H1) in an inverted U-shaped manner. 
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Shifting production among locations involves costs due to partial shutdowns and startups 
(de Meza & van der Ploeg, 1987), changing logistics and labor contracts (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994), 
and commitment of managerial time and attention (Driouchi & Bennett, 2011), in addition to the 
costs of maintaining affiliates operational in light of their switching option value. Indeed, such cost 
or price considerations involved in obtaining an option are often overlooked in prior research (c.f., 
Tong & Reuer, 2007b; Leiblein, Chen, & Posen, 2017; Posen, Leiblein, & Chen, 2018). The 
simulation analysis demonstrates the logic that switching opportunities will reduce when costs of 
switching are greater, ceteris paribus. Hence, the benefits gained from production switching should be 
evaluated against the cost incurred of maintaining and exercising the switching options. Thus, 
benefitting from the switching options in a portfolio of affiliates requires a relative ease of relocating 
production across affiliates, which implies similarity in specific assets, machinery, and facilities. If the 
affiliates in the portfolio have distinct resource requirements and operate in different industries, 
effective switching of production will be considerably hampered, and so gains in operating flexibility 
are less likely and will be less of a consideration in the entry decisions of the multinational firm. 
Therefore, the effect of increased flexibility due to entry hypothesized in H1 will be reduced when 
the affiliates in the existing portfolio operate in different industries, which suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of flexibility increase on firms’ propensity to enter a host country (H1) 
is negatively moderated by product diversification in firms’ affiliate portfolios. 
In addition to the effect of portfolio-level labor cost correlation discussed earlier, a focal 
host country’s labor cost volatility will also play an important role in shaping switching option values 
and affecting firms’ decision to enter the country. Even if differences in labor cost developments are 
conducive to switching, the opportunity to switch may not increase if the focal country’s labor cost 
exhibits little fluctuation such that major changes in relative labor costs are unlikely to occur. Hence, 
from a switching options perspective, the advantages of entry increase in labor cost volatility. We 
argue that this positive effect declines at higher levels of volatility. The intuition, backed up by 
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simulation analysis suggesting that this holds across different labor cost correlation contexts, is as 
follows. When the focal country’s labor cost volatility is very small, its labor cost level will likely 
remain above or below the labor cost levels of other host countries regardless of labor cost 
correlations in the portfolio, resulting in few switching opportunities. As the focal country’s labor 
cost volatility increases, its future labor cost level is more likely to go above or below the labor cost 
levels of other countries, creating more switching opportunities. This effect loses power at higher 
levels of labor cost volatility. When labor cost volatility in a focal country is already high, the 
country’s labor cost level will already frequently go above or below the labor cost levels of other 
countries, such that additional volatility will provide fewer additional switching opportunities. This 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Multinational firms are more likely to enter a new host country, the higher the labor cost 
volatility in that host country; the marginal effect of labor cost volatility declines at higher levels of volatility. 
DATA AND METHODS 
We used panel data covering the population of Japanese publicly listed multinational firms active in 
manufacturing industries provided by the Development Bank of Japan, to examine the role of 
switching options embedded in globally dispersed manufacturing networks. We included those firms 
that operated at least one manufacturing plant abroad during the sample period (1989-2006). We 
collected yearly data on these firms’ manufacturing affiliates abroad from the Directory of Overseas 
Investments published yearly from 1989 by Toyo Keizai Inc., a data source often used in prior strategy 
research on Japanese multinationals. In total, 1,122 Japanese publicly listed manufacturing firms met 
this criterion. We analyze the sample firms’ overseas manufacturing investments in 60 host 
countries, which account for more than 98% of all manufacturing investments abroad by the firms. 
In 47 out of the 60 countries, at least one Japanese firm established a manufacturing affiliate during 
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the period. In total, there are 1,846 entries, among which 376 are subsequent entries. Most entries 
occurred in China (31.42%), followed by Thailand (9.64%), and the U.S. (6.18%).1 
In the empirical analysis, we analyze firms’ propensity to establish a manufacturing affiliate in 
a host country. The set of countries includes countries in which a firm established a manufacturing 
affiliate at some point during the investigation period (non-censored cases), as well as countries in 
which the firm did not invest by the end of the investigation period (censored cases). In total, the 
dataset consists of 49,437 firm-country pairs (potential entries), among which there are 1,846 actual 
entries. On average, each firm-country pair is observed for about 9 years, resulting in 462,216 
observations in total. 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the hazard of a Japanese parent firm establishing a 
manufacturing affiliate in a host country. The decision of a focal firm to enter into a host country, 
Market entry, is a binary variable, which takes the value one when the firm enters a country, and zero 
otherwise. For any given firm, this variable is measured for all potential host countries and all years; 
thus, the unit of analysis is at the firm-country-year level. 
Explanatory variables. The core hypothesis testing variable, Flexibility increase, is the reduction in 
labor cost correlation in the foreign affiliate portfolio due to the addition of a potential host country 
to the portfolio.2 We follow Belderbos et al. (2014) to measure labor cost correlation as follows: 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = [∑ ∑
∑ (𝐶𝑗𝑡−𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅)(𝐶𝑘𝑡−𝐶𝑘̅̅̅̅ )
−4
𝑡=0
𝛿𝑗𝛿𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=2
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
⁄ , where j, k = 1⋯N; j < k  (1) 
 
1 More elaborate descriptives are available in the appendix. 
2 Japan is not included in our portfolio definition. In the latter half  of  our observation period, many Japanese 
firms are reported to have relocated manufacturing activities abroad, maintaining only sales and R&D 
operations or component production in Japan. As we do not have similar data on domestic manufacturing 
plants as we have on overseas plants, we cannot accurately determine portfolios including Japan. 
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where 𝐶𝑗𝑡 and 𝐶𝑘𝑡 represent dollar-denominated labor costs in host countries j and k for year t, 
respectively;  𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ and  𝐶𝑘̅̅ ̅̅  denote average labor costs over the five years including the focal year (t=0) 
in countries j and k; and 𝛿𝑗 and 𝛿𝑘 are the standard deviations of labor costs within these past five 
years in countries j and k. N is the total number of countries in which the firm operates 
manufacturing affiliates. We calculate this variable for the existing portfolio of manufacturing 
affiliates, and for the new portfolio due to the addition of the focal country to the portfolio had the 
entry occurred. The core variable Flexibility increase is then calculated by subtracting the labor cost 
correlation in the new portfolio from the labor cost correlation in the existing portfolio. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we create a variable Labor cost level dispersion increase, which measures the 
increase in the dispersion of labor cost levels in the firm’s portfolio of affiliates due to the addition 
of a new host country to the portfolio. We measure labor cost level dispersion in an affiliate 
portfolio as the standard deviation of labor cost levels of the host countries: 
Labor cost level dispersion= √∑ (𝐶𝑗 − 𝐶̅)
2
/𝑁𝑁𝑗=1 ;                                                                                (2) 
where 𝐶̅ is the average labor cost in the portfolio, Cj is the labor cost level of host country j, and N is 
the total number of countries in which the firm operates manufacturing affiliates. The variable Labor 
cost level dispersion increase is then calculated by subtracting the labor cost level dispersion for the existing 
portfolio from the labor cost level dispersion for the new portfolio due to the addition of a new 
country to the portfolio had the entry occurred. We interact Labor cost level dispersion increase and its 
quadratic term with Flexibility increase to test Hypothesis 2. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we create a variable Diversification that takes into account both the 
number of industries in which a firm operates and the relatedness between the industries in terms of 
characteristics of the underlying resources. Given the well-known concerns about entropy and 
concentric indices, we follow Nocker, Bowen, Stadler and Matzler’s (2016) approach to construct a 
matrix of industry relatedness by focusing on three salient resource characteristics: capital intensity 
(total capital/employees), material intensity (material costs/sales), and R&D intensity. We construct 
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the matrix based on data for all publicly listed firms in Japan using the Development Bank of Japan 
database. The relatedness-weighted Diversification measure for the affiliate portfolio is then defined as 
(1 – relatedness) times the number of industries in the portfolio. The greater the value of (unrelated) 
Diversification, the greater the difficulty and cost to shift production flexibly across countries, reducing 
the importance of flexibility in entry decisions. Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we include Host country 
labor cost volatility and its quadratic term. This variable is calculated as the standard deviation of labor 
cost over a five-year period (from t-4 to t) for the focal country. 
Control variables related to risk reduction. As noted earlier, we aim to juxtapose real options 
explanations of entry with risk reduction considerations. We include measures of the two core 
dimensions of portfolio risk: volatility and correlation in demand. First, we include the variable 
Demand correlation reduction to control for multinational firms’ diversification motives that are 
unrelated to real options logics. Rugman (1976, 1977) suggests that multinational firms can diversify 
away unsystematic risk through international production, although subsequent work by finance 
scholars argue and show that such hedge is better left to shareholders through holding a portfolio of 
diversified securities (e.g., Morck & Yeung, 1991). Conceptually, when an entry reduces GDP 
correlations among the host countries in the portfolio and demand developments thus become more 
divergent across the countries, multinational firms can achieve risk reduction. Demand correlation 
reduction measures the degree to which entry into a potential host country reduces the correlations in 
GDP across the overall portfolio. This variable is expected to take on a positive sign. 
Second, we include the variable Demand volatility reduction, which measures the degree to 
which entry into a potential host country reduces demand volatility. To construct the variable, we 
first calculate the variance of GDP growth over the past five years for each host country in the 
existing portfolio and take the average. The difference between this average value and the variance 
of GDP growth of the focal host country then indicates the extent to which adding this country to 
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the existing portfolio reduces GDP volatility in the overall portfolio. This variable is expected to 
have a positive sign.3 
Other control variables. We include a broad range of controls at the firm and host country levels. 
At the host country level, prior studies suggest that political risk can deter entry into host countries. 
We include a measure of Political risk developed by Henisz (2002). Second, we include the level of 
Labor cost (in thousand dollars) in the potential host country, as well as its Labor cost growth in the year 
prior to entry. Third, to control for market attractiveness, we include the logarithm of GDP as well 
as its GDP growth (in percentage terms) in the year prior to entry (Tong & Li, 2013). Fourth, we 
control for agglomeration effects related to previous Japanese investments in the potential host 
country (Belderbos et al., 2011). Toward this end, we include the number of existing Japanese 
manufacturing affiliates in the country, scaled by one thousand (Japanese agglomeration), and the 
number of existing affiliates in the same industry as the focal Japanese parent firm (Japanese industry 
agglomeration). Fifth, we control for demand uncertainty at the host country level (Campa & 
Goldberg, 1995). To construct the variable Host country demand uncertainty, we follow prior research 
(Kogut, 1991) and regress a host country’s GDP over five years (from t-4 to t) against time, and then 
take the root mean squared error divided by the value of GDP in year t . We include this variable (in 
percentage terms) and its quadratic term. 
We include two control variables related to the inclusion of first entries as well as subsequent 
entries in the analysis. The dummy variable Prior affiliate investment takes the value 1 if a firm has an 
existing manufacturing affiliate in the host country. Prior investment may spur further investments 
due to experience effects and potential collocation benefits (Kogut & Chang, 1996), but it may also 
reduce the probability of entry in favor of further geographic diversification. In addition, we include 
the interaction between Prior affiliate investment and Flexibility increase, to allow for the possibility that 
 
3 Demand correlation reduction and demand volatility reduction may correlate with other (differences in) country 
characteristics, such as those related to the institutional environment. We follow prior research and take GDP 
as the indicator of  demand conditions, while controlling for political risk. 
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switching considerations play a lesser role for subsequent entries, given that a manufacturing affiliate 
is already present in the host country to take up such a switching role. 
The models also include a range of other firm-specific controls. Firm size is measured as the 
logarithm of total assets (in thousand Japanese Yen). Tobin’s q as a proxy for a firm’s intangible 
assets, and its role of intangible assets in foreign direct investment has been widely documented (e.g., 
Morck & Yeung, 1991). Export ratio, the value of exports divided by the firm’s total sales, captures 
preferences to concentrate manufacturing in Japan and possible substitution effects between export 
and overseas production. The average operating years of manufacturing affiliates of the firm 
(International manufacturing experience) controls for experience effects that may affect new investment 
decisions. A dummy variable Sales affiliate indicates whether the firm operates a sales office in a host 
country, which may work as a platform for manufacturing investment (Kogut & Chang, 1996). 
Finally, we allow for a U-shaped effect of multinationality on the propensity to enter new countries, 
by including Multinationality, measured as the number of host countries in the existing portfolio, and 
its quadratic term (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Finally yet importantly, we include a full set of host 
country, industry, and year fixed effects, to control for country and industry heterogeneity as well as 
changing macroeconomic conditions. 
Econometric Models 
Following prior studies on foreign market entry, we conduct survival analysis to model Japanese 
firms’ entry into new host countries. Since our data on entries are measured in discrete time (years) 
rather than in continuous time, we use the complementary loglog (cloglog) model, which is derived 
from the Cox proportional hazard model and is appropriate for continuous duration processes that 
are observed only at discrete intervals. Since each firm can consider entering multiple countries 
simultaneously, we cluster error terms at the firm level (Lin & Wei, 1989). We adopt a strict 
definition of the onset of ‘risk.’ Specifically, we assume that a country is ‘at risk’ of hosting new 
entries by a Japanese firm only when 1) the firm has established at least one foreign sales or 
manufacturing affiliate abroad (showing an intention to internationalize), and 2) the country has 
14 
hosted at least one sales or manufacturing affiliate of a Japanese firm (showing a minimum general 
attractiveness for Japanese FDI). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of variables. The correlation coefficients and 
separate diagnostic analysis do not suggest multicollinearity concerns. 
----------Insert Table 1 here---------- 
Table 2 reports results of the cloglog models of the determinants of foreign entry. Model 1 is 
the baseline model only including the control variables. Models 2-5 add the hypotheses testing 
variables in turn, while Model 6 includes all variables. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that Model 2 
provides a significant improvement in explanatory power over the reference model (Model 1) and 
that Models 3-6 further increase model fit compared to Model 2. 
----------Insert Table 2 here---------- 
Starting with the risk reduction related control variables, the coefficient of Demand correlation 
reduction is positive and significant in all models, indicating that countries with less correlated demand 
developments with the existing countries in the portfolio, allowing the firm to potentially diversify 
away unsystematic risk, are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of entry. The coefficient of 
Demand volatility reduction is also positive and significant, confirming the idea that firms find it more 
attractive to enter into new host countries that reduce average GDP volatility in firms’ portfolio of 
affiliates. These results suggest that risk reduction considerations indeed matter to firms’ foreign 
entry decisions as traditional risk diversification theories of FDI suggest (Rugman, 1976, 1977). 
Among the other control variables in Model 1, the positive and significant signs of Japanese 
agglomeration and Japanese industry agglomeration suggest that agglomeration and potential mimicry 
effects play out at a broad level between Japanese firms (Belderbos et al., 2011). There is evidence for 
a non-monotonic relationship between host country demand uncertainty and entry, with a negative 
and significant coefficient of Host country demand uncertainty, and a positive and (marginally) significant 
coefficient for its quadratic term, consistent with prior research on entry (Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Li 
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& Li, 2010). Larger firms (Firm size) exhibit a greater propensity to enter into new countries, while 
International manufacturing experience has a negative and significant coefficient. One explanation for the 
latter finding is that firms operating older affiliates, which had their major expansions in the past, are 
less inclined to establish new affiliates. Export ratio is negative and significant, suggesting that 
substitution effects between foreign and domestic production affect international expansion. There 
is a nonlinear effect of Multinationality on the propensity to enter: the inflection point is reached at 15 
countries, which is only a feature of the most internationalized firms in the sample, but which still 
falls within the sample range of (1 – 32). The positive and significant coefficient of Sales affiliate 
suggests that prior investment to expand market reach in the host country increases the propensity 
that the firm establishes manufacturing affiliates in that country as well. 
Turning to the hypothesis testing variables, Flexibility increase has a positive and significant 
coefficient in Models 2-6, supporting the baseline Hypothesis 1 that the greater Flexibility increase, the 
higher the firm’s propensity to enter a new host country. Hypothesis 2 suggests that there is a 
moderating effect of Labor cost level dispersion increase regarding the impact of Flexibility increase on the 
propensity to enter and that this effect takes an inverted-U shape. In both Models 3 and 6, the 
coefficient of the linear interaction term is significantly positive and that of the quadratic interaction 
term is significantly negative, in support of this hypothesis. The inflection point of the moderating 
effect (in Model 6) is at a Labor cost level dispersion increase of 1.16 (i.e., a 1.16 standard deviation 
increase in labor cost level dispersion). This point falls in the actual range of Labor cost level dispersion 
increase [-0.726, 4.162], with 5.46% of observations exhibiting a larger value than the inflection point 
value. In line with Hypothesis 3, the coefficient of the interaction term between Flexibility increase and 
Diversification, in Models 4 and 6, is negative and significant. Hypothesis 4 predicts that Host country 
labor cost volatility has a positive effect on firms’ propensity to enter but that the marginal effect is 
declining. This hypothesis receives qualified support, as shown by the positive and significant 
coefficient of the variable, and the negative and marginally significant (p<0.10) coefficient of the 
quadratic term in Models 5 and 6. The inflection point of Host country labor cost volatility is relatively 
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close to the maximum in the sample and is broadly in line with the notion of a declining marginal 
impact. 
The implied magnitudes of the effects confirmed meaningful effects of the variables related 
to the real options logic as well as the variables representing risk reduction. A one standard deviation 
increase in the variable Flexibility increase increases the hazard of entry by 21 percent. The moderation 
effects are also sizeable, with the effect of Flexibility increase estimated at 79 percent at the inflection 
point of Labor cost level dispersion increase under low Diversification, but easily reaching zero at high levels 
of Diversification and at particularly low or high values of Labor cost level dispersion increase. The effect on 
the hazard of entry due to Host country labor cost volatility is 23 percent in the mean of the variable. The 
risk reduction variables also have sizeable estimated effects: an 11 and 19 percent increase in the 
hazard of entry can be calculated for the risk reduction variables Demand volatility reduction and 
Demand correlation reduction, respectively. 
Our results were robust to employing a different measure of diversification, the use of Cox 
models with different assumptions regarding the onset of risk, and to limiting the analysis to actual 
entries or countries with larger numbers of entries. 
DISCUSSION 
Our study juxtaposed switching option considerations (Kogut, 1995; de Meza & van der 
Ploeg, 1987; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994) with the more traditional risk diversification motivation for 
foreign expansion (Rugman, 1976, 1977). Our hypotheses on the role of flexibility derived from real 
options theory provided predictions that are either contrasting or complementing risk diversification 
theory that focuses on the role of entry in reducing demand and revenue stream volatility in firms’ 
host country portfolios. Our results showed that both theories have important roles to play in 
explaining firms’ foreign entry decision, with meaningful and comparable magnitudes of the implied 
effects. 
Our study contributes to the real options literature by identifying several important 
moderating factors of the influence of flexibility (switching options) considerations on firms’ market 
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entry decisions. First, we show that (changes in) labor cost level dispersion in the portfolio moderate 
the effect of flexibility on entry in an inverted U-shaped fashion. Specifically, modest differences 
between a target country’s labor cost level and existing countries’ labor cost levels enhance switching 
opportunities, as small differences provide few switching benefits while large differences make 
switching less likely. Second, to the extent that affiliates operate in different industries, the difficulty 
of switching activities between affiliates is increased, thus reducing the salience of flexibility 
considerations for market entry decisions. Third, we also find that labor cost volatility in the host 
country increases the likelihood of entry, as such volatility uniformly increases switching 
opportunities. Overall, our study responds to calls to contribute to real options research by focusing 
on how an individual investment decision may be shaped by related investments in the portfolio 
(Tong & Reuer, 2007b; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). 
Most prior studies on foreign entry have in common that they treat entry decisions as events 
that can be analyzed independently, neglecting the question of how such decisions may be affected 
by firms’ existing portfolio of overseas affiliates. Our study adds to the literature adopting a 
portfolio approach to examine international market entry and exit (e.g., Belderbos & Zou, 2009; 
Fisch & Zschoche, 2012), by taking into account that new affiliates can be complementary or 
redundant in the firm’s affiliate portfolio. Drawn from real options theory, this portfolio approach 
has been adopted in prior research (Trigeorgis, 1996), but has found little application in the (foreign) 
market entry literature. 
Our study also contributes to international strategy research more generally. For instance, 
though we do not investigate performance effects, our study’s design and findings have implications 
for the literature on multinationality and performance (e.g., Lu & Beamish, 2004). Despite the 
significant contributions made, scholars suggest that this literature has neglected the role of host 
country environments (e.g., Hennart, 2011). The consequences of multinationality are not just a 
manifestation of the number of host countries in which to operate, but are shaped by attributes of 
the existing countries in the portfolio, as well as attributes of new host countries firms seek to enter. 
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From a managerial perspective, our work echoes calls in prior research that to reap benefits of 
switching options, managers need to be aware of such options and have the capabilities in place to 
manage them effectively (Kogut, 1985; Belderbos et al., 2014; Posen et al., 2018). Future work aimed 
at understanding the specific ways multinationality affects firm performance will benefit from 
explicitly considering the configuration and heterogeneous characteristics of firms’ portfolio of host 
countries and affiliates, as well as managerial awareness and capabilities to act upon these. 
We note several avenues for future research that can help address some of the limitations of 
our study. Future research can examine the generalizability of our findings by comparing the role of 
operating flexibility in affecting entries of firms based in different home countries. While our paper 
joins recent work to study the operating flexibility of firms based in countries other than the U.S., 
some of our findings may be seen as being more salient to Japanese firms. For instance, Japanese 
multinationals have invested substantially in a broad set of countries with relatively heterogeneous 
operating environments, making switching options considerations and their boundaries potentially 
more important. Future research focusing on other forms of country heterogeneity that our study is 
not able to capture will also be particularly valuable. Finally, our study has juxtaposed real options 
and risk diversification explanations of foreign entry, and we encourage future research to develop 
other approaches to identify specific contexts where one explanation may dominate the other. As 
multinational firms are increasingly operating across countries with heterogeneous conditions, 
understanding how they coordinate operations among a portfolio of affiliates to achieve flexibility 
and other benefits is likely to take on greater importance. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables μ S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
  1 Market entry 0.004 0.063                      
  2 Flexibility increase -0.083 0.468 0.012                     
  3 Labor cost level dispersion increase 0.329 0.604 -0.027 -0.266                    
  4 Diversification 0.534 0.902 0.027 0.131 -0.241                   
  5 Host country labor cost volatility 1.429 1.585 -0.028 -0.141 0.377 0.013                  
  6 Demand volatility reduction -0.023 0.083 0.021 -0.024 -0.002 0.029 -0.106                 
  7 Demand correlation reduction -0.010 0.373 0.005 0.028 0.050 0.045 0.069 0.100                
  8 Prior affiliate investment 0.018 0.132 0.089 0.024 -0.066 0.077 -0.033 0.040 0.007               
  9 Political risk 0.423 0.164 -0.053 -0.014 0.125 0.010 0.314 -0.039 0.037 -0.060              
10 Labor cost 1.321 1.243 -0.029 -0.107 0.424 0.009 0.847 0.081 0.078 -0.028 0.369             
11 Labor cost growth 0.051 0.153 0.007 -0.142 0.016 -0.001 0.064 -0.163 -0.013 0.002 -0.041 0.023            
12 GDP 25.846 1.375 0.043 -0.028 0.098 -0.027 0.247 0.022 0.050 0.092 0.142 0.343 0.034           
13 GDP growth 6.928 12.894 0.013 -0.104 -0.002 0.002 0.030 -0.260 0.000 0.004 -0.096 -0.025 0.698 -0.018          
14 Japanese agglomeration 0.060 0.130 0.136 -0.050 -0.005 -0.043 -0.148 0.090 -0.038 0.244 -0.234 -0.122 0.019 0.332 0.016         
15 Japanese industry agglomeration 6.545 18.941 0.114 -0.031 -0.013 -0.052 -0.108 0.068 -0.025 0.218 -0.181 -0.091 0.016 0.251 0.014 0.748        
16 Host country demand uncertainty 6.269 5.506 -0.016 0.152 -0.049 0.004 0.009 -0.586 -0.055 -0.016 0.034 -0.143 -0.087 -0.048 -0.074 -0.036 -0.033       
17 Firm size 18.304 1.445 0.035 0.132 -0.279 0.444 0.007 0.037 0.030 0.087 -0.003 -0.009 0.005 -0.055 0.007 -0.055 -0.049 -0.006      
18 Tobin's q 1.265 0.595 0.002 -0.037 -0.021 -0.013 0.023 -0.057 -0.013 -0.007 -0.029 -0.029 0.029 -0.041 0.032 -0.017 0.015 -0.032 0.035     
19 Export ratio 0.078 0.156 0.010 0.014 -0.075 0.073 -0.031 -0.031 0.010 -0.006 -0.012 -0.045 -0.032 -0.061 -0.045 -0.016 0.036 -0.015 0.178 0.123    
20 Int’l manufacturing experience 8.216 6.132 0.000 0.037 -0.066 0.015 0.005 0.050 0.007 0.013 -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.157 -0.027 0.034   
21 Multinationality 3.448 2.960 0.042 0.183 -0.360 0.502 0.027 0.078 0.061 0.152 0.015 0.021 0.003 -0.039 0.008 -0.066 -0.034 0.006 0.594 0.006 0.109 0.154  
22 Sales affiliate 0.052 0.222 0.077 0.010 -0.068 0.093 0.015 0.067 0.009 0.528 -0.059 0.054 -0.001 0.198 -0.008 0.253 0.236 -0.045 0.170 0.014 0.077 0.032 0.174 
Note: Correlations in bold are significant at p<0.01. 
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Table 2. Cloglog Hazard Model Analysis: the Determinants of Foreign Entry 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Flexibility increase  0.311 0.440 0.236 0.320 0.370 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Labor cost level dispersion increase * Flex. increase   0.839   0.716 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Labor cost level dispersion increase^2 * Flex. increase   -0.370   -0.309 
   (0.001)   (0.004) 
Diversification * Flexibility increase    -0.350  -0.264 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Host country labor cost volatility     0.330 0.303 
     (0.015) (0.025) 
Host country labor cost volatility^2     -0.043 -0.039 
     (0.070) (0.095) 
Demand volatility reduction 1.321 1.271 1.181 1.273 1.384 1.305 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
Demand correlation reduction 0.468 0.492 0.480 0.492 0.484 0.474 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior affiliate investment  -0.061 -0.069 -0.061 -0.061 -0.068 
  (0.715) (0.676) (0.715) (0.714) (0.684) 
Prior affiliate investment * Flexibility increase  -0.059 0.097 0.091 -0.070 0.180 
  (0.847) (0.756) (0.762) (0.819) (0.560) 
Political risk 0.288 0.301 0.300 0.307 0.302 0.306 
 (0.404) (0.381) (0.383) (0.372) (0.384) (0.379) 
Labor cost -0.177 -0.200 -0.222 -0.209 -0.243 -0.266 
 (0.274) (0.215) (0.171) (0.196) (0.195) (0.158) 
Labor cost growth 0.054 0.074 0.068 0.063 0.058 0.046 
 (0.831) (0.770) (0.788) (0.804) (0.819) (0.857) 
GDP -0.163 -0.041 -0.064 -0.082 -0.226 -0.262 
 (0.520) (0.872) (0.802) (0.749) (0.405) (0.336) 
GDP growth 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.187) (0.158) (0.169) (0.173) (0.201) (0.222) 
Japanese agglomeration 0.555 0.495 0.500 0.521 0.576 0.594 
 (0.040) (0.069) (0.067) (0.056) (0.042) (0.036) 
Japanese industry agglomeration 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Host country demand uncertainty -0.034 -0.035 -0.036 -0.034 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.031) (0.040) (0.031) (0.027) 
Host country demand uncertainty^2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.063) (0.057) 
Firm size 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.219 0.220 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s q -0.037 -0.034 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 -0.028 
 (0.586) (0.614) (0.637) (0.652) (0.633) (0.677) 
Export ratio -0.549 -0.554 -0.561 -0.560 -0.556 -0.566 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
International manufacturing experience -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Multinationality 0.268 0.266 0.263 0.264 0.266 0.262 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Multinationality^2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales affiliate 0.479 0.494 0.487 0.490 0.494 0.486 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Labor cost level dispersion increase -0.786 -0.724 -0.706 -0.720 -0.717 -0.700 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Labor cost level dispersion increase^2 -0.135 -0.142 -0.103 -0.133 -0.144 -0.108 
 (0.346) (0.324) (0.476) (0.353) (0.319) (0.456) 
Diversification 0.047 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.045 0.049 
 (0.119) (0.143) (0.128) (0.109) (0.140) (0.108) 
Constant -5.291 -8.381 -7.737 -7.329 -3.926 -2.934 
 (0.428) (0.212) (0.250) (0.277) (0.578) (0.678) 
Observations 462216 462216 462216 462216 462216 462216 
AUC 0.9239 0.9244 0.9250 0.9248 0.9245 0.9253 
Log Likelihood -8706.228 -8699.216 -8689.959 -8693.646 -8696.148 -8684.335 
LLR Test (χ2): Expanded model vs. basic model a  14.02 18.51 11.14 6.14 29.76 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.047) (0.000) 
Notes: a For Model 2, the comparison model is Model 1; for Models 3-6, the comparison model is Model 2. p-values based on firm-
clustered error terms in parentheses (two-tailed tests). Country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects are included 
and are all jointly significant. All models are significant at p<0.001. AUC (area under the ROC curve) is a goodness of fit measure. 
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APPENDIX 
Due to space constraint, this appendix presents 1) simulation analysis of the impact of Labor cost level dispersion 
increase and Host country labor cost volatility on switching opportunities, and 2) interpretation of effect sizes 3) 
sample descriptives. 
 
A1. SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
We develop a stylized simulation model to explore the impact of Labor cost level dispersion increase and Host 
country labor cost volatility on switching opportunities, the conclusions of which are stated in Hypotheses 2 and 
4, respectively. Whereas option valuation models have been developed for the case of two countries in an 
affiliate portfolio (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994), modeling complexity increases substantially with multiple 
countries in the portfolio. In our simulation analysis, we model the probability of actual switching between 
countries rather than constructing a full-fledged model of switching option valuation. We assume that a firm 
has manufacturing operations in two countries, A and B, and that the firm considers establishing a 
manufacturing plant in a third country, C (adding this new country to the affiliate portfolio). We assume for 
expository purposes that labor costs in Countries A and B are perfectly positively correlated, while labor costs 
in Country C are perfectly negatively correlated with both A and B (relaxing these assumptions does not alter 
findings). By adding Country C to the affiliate portfolio, the average labor cost correlation within the 
portfolio decreases from 1 to -0.33. Hence, entry into Country C increases operational flexibility, which is due 
to the negative correlation of this country’s labor costs and the labor costs of the existing countries (A and B) 
in the portfolio. 
Labor Cost Level Dispersion Increase 
Now we introduce mean labor cost levels in Countries A, B, and C, and a stochastic process underlying the 
development of labor costs over time. For simplicity, we assume that the standard deviation of this stochastic 
process describing labor cost developments is identical in the three countries, but that the mean labor cost 
levels do differ. Assume that labor costs in Country A are drawn from a normal distribution N(1, 0.1), and 
that for Country B, this distribution is N(2, 0.1). We now let the mean labor cost level of Country C vary to 
examine the consequences for switching opportunities. The mean labor cost level of Country C that leads to 
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the lowest labor cost level dispersion in the affiliate portfolio is 1.5 - exactly in between the existing labor cost 
levels of Country A and Country B. In this case, adding Country C to the portfolio reduces the labor cost 
level dispersion (defined as the standard deviation of labor cost levels in the portfolio) from 0.7 to 0.5, that is: 
labor cost level dispersion decreases by 0.2. If the mean labor cost level of Country C would be either smaller 
than 1.5 (but larger than 1) or larger than 1.5 (but smaller than 2), the ‘averaging’ role of Country C in the 
portfolio is reduced, hence adding Country C to the portfolio reduces labor cost level dispersion to a lesser 
degree. For instance, if the mean labor cost level of Country C is 1.1 or 1.9, adding the country to the 
portfolio leads to a labor cost level dispersion of 0.55, and labor cost level dispersion decreases by a smaller 
amount (i.e., 0.15). If the mean labor cost level of Country C would go beyond the initial levels of Countries 
A and B (i.e., lower than 1 or higher than 2), adding Country C to the portfolio increases labor cost level 
dispersion again. For instance, if the mean labor cost level of Country C is 2.58 or 0.42, adding this country to 
the portfolio increases the labor cost level dispersion from 0.7 to 0.8; hence labor cost level dispersion 
increases by 0.1. 
What then are the consequences for the firm’s switching opportunities of adding Country C to the 
portfolio? To explore this, we randomly draw 1,000 values of labor costs of Countries A, B and C, assuming 
that the labor cost developments of these countries follow a normal distribution. We examine for each of 
these draws whether a switching opportunity occurs. We define the occurrence of a switching opportunity as 
the situation when the volatility in labor costs induces a reversal in existing labor cost rankings between 
Country C on the one hand and Countries A or B on the other hand, and when the resulting labor cost 
savings from switching (between A and C, or between B and C) are greater than the switching cost (the cost 
of shifting production incurred). We count the number of switching opportunities with the set of 1,000 draws 
for different scenarios: for different values of the mean labor costs of Country C (hence implying different 
levels of Labor cost level dispersion increase) and for two levels of switching cost (0.01 and 0.05); and we compare 
our simulation results across scenarios. 
Figure A1 shows the results of this simulation exercise. The horizontal axis measures Labor cost level 
dispersion increase due to the addition of Country C to the affiliate portfolio; the vertical axis measures the 
number of times a switching opportunity occurs (in 1,000 draws), as defined above. The lines therefore show 
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the number of times a switching opportunity occurs as a function of the change in labor cost level dispersion 
due to the addition of Country C to the portfolio. The solid line is the case where the switching cost is 0.01 
and the dotted line represents the case when the switching cost is 0.05; as expected, the two lines show that 
when the switching cost is lower, there are greater switching opportunities, everything else constant. The 
graphs are drawn conditional on an increase in operating flexibility (i.e., a reduction in labor cost correlation 
between countries within the portfolio) due to the addition of Country C to the portfolio (Hypothesis 1), as 
we are interested in the moderating effect of labor cost level dispersion increase on the relationship between 
operating flexibility and entry (Hypothesis 2). 
The graphs indicate a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between switching opportunities and the 
change in labor cost level dispersion due to the entry in country C Specifically, switching opportunities first 
rise as a function of Labor cost level dispersion increase, but subsequently decline from a Labor cost level dispersion 
increase of about -0.1, and then reach zero at a Labor cost level dispersion increase of about 0.1. The intuition is that, 
at the minimum labor cost level dispersion increase – i.e., when Country C has a mean labor cost level right in 
the middle of existing labor cost levels in the portfolio – there is little chance of a reversal in labor cost 
rankings due to volatility, as the distances in the labor cost levels of country C on the one hand, and 
Countries A and B on the other, are at their maximum (within the range between the labor cost levels of 
Countries A and B). Hence there are  few switching opportunities. When the mean labor cost level of 
Country C is closer to the mean level of Country A or B, the probability of switching due to a reversal in 
labor cost rankings increases due to the narrowing of the gap with one of these countries. When the mean 
labor cost level of Country C then goes  beyond the minimum or maximum levels in the existing portfolio 
(i.e., the mean labor cost level of Country A or Country B), the probability of switching declines and at some 
point approximates zero. Further simulation results,  available upon request, show that this inverted U-shaped 
relationship is a general pattern, holding true for various combinations of labor cost volatility and pairwise 
correlations in labor costs. 
Host Country Labor Cost Volatility 
As above, we assume that labor costs in Countries A, B, and C are drawn from a normal distribution N(1, 
0.1), N(2, 0.1), and N(1.5, 0.1), respectively, while for the focal host country, Country C, we let the standard 
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deviation of its labor cost vary to examine the consequences for switching opportunities while keeping the 
other parameters constant. Figure A2 shows the results of this simulation exercise. The horizontal axis 
measures Country C’s labor cost volatility represented by the standard deviation of labor cost. The vertical 
axis measures the number of times a switching opportunity occurs (out of 1,000 draws), as defined above. 
The lines therefore show the number of times a switching opportunity occurs as a function of the labor cost 
volatility in Country C. The solid line is the case when the switching cost is 0.01 and the dotted line the case 
when the switching cost is 0.05; as expected, the two lines show that when the switching cost is lower, there 
are greater switching opportunities, everything else constant. The graphs show a monotonous positive 
relationship between switching opportunities and labor cost volatility in Country C, with the marginal effect 
of labor cost volatility declining. The curve takes the typical shape of a partial inverted-U. The intuition is that 
the greater the labor cost volatility in Country C, the greater the likelihood of a reversal of labor cost rankings 
in comparison with Countries A and B in the portfolio, thus creating more switching opportunities. The 
magnitude of this effect finds a plateau at higher levels of Host country labor cost volatility, because at such levels 
most switching opportunities are already obtained, and it becomes less likely that greater volatility will further 
increase such opportunities substantially. Results of this simulation exercise can be replicated for other sets of 
values of the mean and standard deviation of labor cost in Countries A and B, as well as correlations of labor 
cost between the two countries, with the observed patterns identical (results are available upon request). 
 
A2. EFFECT SIZES 
In non-linear models such as the cloglog model, marginal effects, and in particular interaction effects, are 
difficult to infer, as the effects depend on the hazard as well as the values of the explanatory variables. One 
solution is to calculate the pseudo elasticity 
ln(h(t|𝑋𝑘))
𝑑𝑋𝑘
 of the entry hazard with respect to a change in the 
explanatory variables. This pseudo elasticity is a linear combination of the explanatory variables and 
coefficients, and indicates the proportional increase in the entry hazard as a result of a one-unit change in 
explanatory variables. To standardize this pseudo elasticity and to provide appropriate comparisons across 
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different variables and parameter estimates, we scale the effect to a one standard deviation change (rather 
than a one-unit change) across the explanatory variables. 
The calculated effect sizes confirmed meaningful effects of the variables related to real options 
theory, in comparison with the effects of other variables. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in 
the variable Flexibility increase increases the hazard of entry by 21 percent. A comparable effect is observed (23 
percent) for Host country labor cost volatility. By comparison, the effect sizes are 11 and 19 percent for the risk 
reduction variables Demand volatility reduction and Demand correlation reduction, respectively. The effect sizes 
compare to a relatively large effect of Firm size (37 percent) but smaller effects of Sales affiliate (11 percent) and 
Japanese agglomeration (8 percent), for instance. 
To gauge the moderating influence of Labor cost level dispersion increase and Diversification on the effect of 
Flexibility increase on the probability of entry we calculate the effect size of Flexibility increase, expressed as 
pseudo elasticity, for different levels of the moderators. Figure A3 illustrates the pseudo elasticity (the 
proportional increase in the hazard of entry) as a function of Labor cost level dispersion increase (drawn over the 
1st to 99th percentile range) for three levels of Diversification. The highest proportional increase in the hazard of 
entry due to a one standard deviation increase in flexibility is about 0.79, i.e., a seventy-nine percent increase 
in the hazard of entry. The three lines generally show a pattern in which the effect of Flexibility increase on the 
hazard of entry rises with the level of Labor cost level dispersion increase up to an inflection point, after which the 
hazard of entry begins to decrease. This pattern illustrates the prediction of Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the 
lines shift upward as the level of Diversification in the firm’s affiliate portfolio decreases, illustrating the 
prediction of Hypotheses 3. 
 
A3. DESCRIPTIVES 
Tables A1-A3 report the distribution of entries by host country, year, and industry. 
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Figure A1. Switching Opportunities as a Function of Labor Cost Level Dispersion Increase 
 
 
Notes: The vertical axis measures the number of times a switching opportunity occurs (out of 1,000 draws), and the 
horizontal axis measures Labor cost level dispersion increase (i.e., the increase in labor cost level dispersion due to the addition 
of Country C to the affiliate portfolio). The solid line refers to the case where the switching cost is 0.01, and the dotted 
line the case where the switching cost is 0.05. Both lines show a clear inverted U-shaped relationship between switching 
opportunities and Labor cost level dispersion increase, conditional on an increase in operating flexibility. The relative positions 
of the two lines indicate that switching opportunities decrease as switching cost increases. 
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Figure A2. Switching Opportunities as a Function of Host Country Labor Cost Volatility 
 
 
Notes: The vertical axis measures the number of times a switching opportunity occurs (out of 1,000 draws), and the 
horizontal axis measures Host country labor cost volatility of the focal country C. The solid line refers to the case where the 
switching cost is 0.01, and the dotted line the case where the switching cost is 0.05. Both lines show a non-linear 
relationship between switching opportunities and Host country labor cost volatility. The marginal effect of Host country labor 
cost volatility gradually declines and approximates zero at some point. The relative positions of the two lines indicates that 
switching opportunities decrease as switching cost increases. 
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Figure A3. The Moderating Effects of Labor Cost Level Dispersion Increase and Diversification on 
the Proportional Increase in the Entry Hazard with respect to Flexibility Increase 
 
 
Notes: The vertical axis measures the proportional increase in the hazard of entry (i.e., the value 100 reflects a doubling 
of the entry hazard), and the horizontal axis measures Labor cost level dispersion increase (i.e., the increase in labor cost level 
dispersion due to entry into a new host country). Thus, the graph depicts the proportional increase in the hazard of entry 
due to a one standard deviation change in Flexibility increase (i.e., the decrease in labor cost correlation due to entry into a 
new host country) as a function of Labor cost level dispersion increase. The positions of the lines depend on the level of 
Diversification in the affiliate portfolio. To illustrate, the lines are drawn at three levels of Diversification: two standard 
deviations below the mean (low), mean, and two standard deviations above the mean (high), respectively. All three lines 
take an inverted U-shape, indicating that the hazard of entry decreases at high levels of Labor cost level dispersion increase; 
this pattern illustrates the prediction of Hypothesis 2. The lines shift upward as the level of Diversification decreases, 
illustrating the prediction of Hypotheses 3. 
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Table A1. Entry Distribution by Host Region/Country 
 
Region / Country 
No. of 
Entries Share (%) 
Asia 1,262 68.36 
   (China) (580) (31.42) 
   (Thailand) (178) (9.64) 
   (Malaysia) (95) (5.15) 
Europe 345 18.69 
North America 164 8.88 
   (United States) (114) (6.18) 
South America 26 1.41 
Africa 15 0.81 
Oceania 34 1.84 
Total 1,846 100.00 
 
Table A2. Entry Distribution by Year 
 
Year No. of Entries Share (%) 
1990 91 4.93 
1991 68 3.68 
1992 75 4.06 
1993 78 4.23 
1994 127 6.88 
1995 173 9.37 
1996 180 9.75 
1997 147 7.96 
1998 103 5.58 
1999 94 5.09 
2000 105 5.69 
2001 126 6.83 
2002 149 8.07 
2003 122 6.61 
2004 106 5.74 
2005 65 3.52 
2006 37 2.00 
Total 1,846 100.00 
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Table A3. Entry Distribution by Industry 
 
Industry No. of Entries Share (%) 
Food 82 4.44 
Textile 38 2.06 
Wood and furniture 6 0.33 
Pulp and paper 16 0.87 
Printing 9 0.49 
Chemicals 284 15.38 
Petroleum refining 7 0.38 
Rubber products 72 3.90 
Ceramics, stone and clay products 72 3.90 
Iron and steel 14 0.76 
Non-ferrous metals 45 2.44 
Fabricated metals 47 2.55 
General machinery 224 12.13 
Electrical machinery 401 21.72 
Transport equipment, shipbuilding 20 1.08 
Automobile 405 21.94 
Precision instrument 60 3.25 
Miscellaneous 44 2.38 
Total 1,846 100.00 
 
